As I saw the final game of the Dodgers-Yankee series, I couldn’t help but wonder aloud why it is closers seem to have far more trouble in non-save situations (nSS) than in save situations (SS). Oh wait, that was Joe Morgan wondering aloud. Yeah, definitely not me. Anyway, if those are the guys with the most ability to keep their cool when the pressure is at the highest, you’d think they’d excel in a situation with less on the line, right?

Is it that they get complacent? I suppose it’s possible, but doesn’t that fly in the face of the supposed “closer’s bulldog mentality”? Beyond that, are we even sure that the numbers are worse in non-save situations? We hear about it, but I’ve yet to see a report on it. One with numbers and not narrative, at least. By now you probably see where I’m going with all this. That’s right, I’m going to take a look at 2010′s closers with ten or more saves and see if there really are any drastic numbers.

From L to R: ERA in save situations; ERA in non-save situations; WHIP in save sit.; WHIP in non-save sit.; IP in save sit.; IP in non-save sit.; OPS against in save situations; OPS against in non-save sit.

The spreadsheet is all screwy. My bad. Also, I realize this isn’t the most scientific of posts —WHIP and ERA are not the best measurements of how successful a pitcher is in a situation and neither is OPS against, and the sample could be quite a bit bigger— but I think this gives us a fairly good snapshot of how the players perform in both respective situations. If there’s another study on this (one that’s more comprehensive and perhaps use better metrics), let me know. The prevailing wisdom —or at least effused by such luminaries as the ESPN BBTN crew during the game— is that closers perform better in save situations. For some, this is true. For others, it couldn’t be further from the truth.

After averaging all the totals, according to ERA, closers in nSS are actually better, albeit not by a great amount at 2.93 to 2.90. In total, 10 of the 25 closers are better in SS in ERA. Whoa there! What appears to have made the largest difference in the discrepancy is the zeros thrown up by Mariano, Jose Valverde and Brian Wilson in a collective 38.2 innings.

Jose Valerde, either celebrating or doing something illegal.

Let’s see how they do on WHIP. According to the data — which, remember, is only from 2010, so it’s by no means comprehensive — closers in SS do slightly better, notching a WHIP of 1.17 to 1.23 in nSS. Quite a few players have much better WHIPS in save situations than in non-save — Dotel is significantly better (.0927 to 2.206!), as are Soriano, Jenks and Aardsma.

If I can just make a stray observation here, holy ‘badZonaroni, look at Chad Qualls’s numbers. Straight up, his ERA in non-save situations this year is AJ Burnett’s June. In save opportunities, he’s roughly Chad Gaudin. His WHIP is almost 2.5 in non-save situations and players are hitting a Ruthian 1.277 OPS against him.

How can your bullpen be SO BAD that you seriously put the guy who faces a lineup of Babe Ruth’s every time out, the role of closer? For a moment, sit back and imagine waking up one morning to find out that Boone Logan replaced Mariano Rivera as the Yankee closer. Then think that he was actually the best guy to take the job, considering the incredible sucktitude of the others. At that point, I’d probably get my asshole all wet, sit next to an electrical socket and put one end of a fork in the butt hole and the other in the wall hole. It would be better than watching the baseball-related travesty on television.

Back to the action. OPS says that closers in the non-save spot do better than those in save situations. Again, as the numbers bear out again, there are wild differences in how some perform. Joakim Soria suffocates batters in NSS but suddenly crumbles when he needs to channel his inner-bulldog. Jenks pitches fairly respectably but loses his shit when there’s no opportunity for the save.

Neftali Feliz and Rafael Soriano put it in beast mode when the SS is up, but are somewhat less impressive when the leverage is lower. Others have the opposite trend going. Cordero, Soria, Franklin, Rauch, F-Rod, Capps and Heath Bell are all way better when the game isn’t “on the line”. Most of the others are fairly even between situations, though that doesn’t mean their numbers aren’t eye-popping. Look at Jose Valverde and Mariano Rivera’s numbers on the year. For all his antics and dance party theatrics, Valverde has good reason to celebrate. The Tigers closer is rendering batters he faces into Ramiro Pena.

"When did you win this, Joe?" "No way to tell." "Because you can't predict the future?" "Correct."

While I haven’t figured out why pitchers do or do not perform better in the two “situations,” I think I’ve at least cast some doubt that closers are uniformly great in the 9th and struggle otherwise. There are some drastic splits on both sides of the aisle, and this idea is likely some media-based, false-narrative myth. We’d need to look for more into the context of each situation and eventually compile enough raw data over the course of seasons to draw any real conclusions. Frankly, I’m not up for that kind of research project.

My guess is we’d likely see more of what we see here on this spreadsheet. Some do better in one, some better in others, most with little great difference. Maybe some really don’t “care” as much when they’re not in line for a save, grow complacent and get hit around. Perhaps they’re pitching to contact to limit walks and baserunners. Maybe others just aren’t mentally-designed to “handle” the pressure of a save situation but excel when they don’t have the world watching as closely. Whatever the case, I’m secure in my belief that Joe Morgan is wrong about virtually everything in life.